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Abstract
Objective. Our study seeks to understand the role of perceived
economic stress of the Great Recession on political
participation among blacks, whites and Latinos. Methods. We use
the 2012 Collaborative Multi-Racial Political Study and negative
binomial regression to examine the impact of financial hardship
on black, Hispanic, and white political participation. Results.
We find that political participation among whites is unaffected
by the Great Recession and is largely motivated by political
interest. Blacks are mobilized by financial hardship even after
controlling for political enthusiasm and linked fate. Hispanics
have the lowest level of political participation. Conclusion.
Overall, we conclude that the Great Recession did affect
political behavior but differently across race and ethnic
groups; specifically, Hispanics were least likely to politically
engage if they experienced negative consequences of the Great
Recession.
Keywords: Great Recession; Political Engagement; African
American/Black; Hispanic; Latino; Personal Economic Stress;
Linked Fate
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Introduction
The recent economic downturn of 2008-2009, the Great
Recession, had a profound impact on the lives of many Americans.
With unemployment rates reaching as high as 16% for some
subgroups and the number of homes lost to foreclosure reaching
about 5 million, it is easy to suggest the immense impact the
recession had on millions of Americans (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2010; Bocian et al., 2012). While the Great
Recession significantly impacted the economic prospects for many
Americans, the outcomes were disproportionately felt by
communities of color and immigrants across the country (Jones,
2009; Reece and Gambhir, 2008; Taylor et al., 2011).
Disproportionate increases in unemployment among blacks and
Hispanics (Applied Research Center, 2009; Rivera et al., 2009;
Weller, Fields, and Agbede, 2011) against the backdrop of lower
overall savings and accumulated wealth left many families of
color struggling in their daily lives (Berndt and James, 2009).
Moreover, the economic recession had a marked impact on how
the electorate views government and political institutions, with
approval ratings for Congress reaching all-time lows driven
largely by the perceived inability of the federal government to
3

reverse the downward spiral of the economy (Gallup, 2013).
Public attitudes toward government and political institutions
are critical, as these psychological attitudes impact outcomes
such as interest in politics and political participation.
The focus of our study is to understand the role of
perceived economic stress of the Great Recession on political
participation across race and ethnic groups; we link our
respondents’ financial hardship during the Great Recession to
their political participation. We use the 2012 Collaborative
Multi-Racial Political Study to examine our primary hypothesis
that financial hardship of the Great Recession will influence
the political participation of race and ethnic groups
differently according to available resources.
Resources and Political Engagement
The Great Recession provides an opportunity to further
understand the long-standing relationship between resources and
political engagement. Resource mobilization theory emphasizes
the importance of resources for an engaged civic life and the
availability of resources for political engagement (Brady, Verba
and Schlozman, 1995). Individuals with greater resources, both
material and psychological, are better able engage in the
political sphere (Garcia Bedolla and Michelson, 2012). Multiple
types of resources impact an individual’s level of political
4

engagement (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995), the foremost of
which is socio-economic status (Logan, Darrah, and Oh, 2012;
Verba et al., 1993; Leighley and Nagler 1992a, 1992b; Leighley,
1990; Nie et al., 1988; Nagel, 1987; Wolfinger and Rosenstone,
1980; Verba and Nie, 1972). While educational attainment and
income are salient resources for political participation,
scholars have found that other resources such as interest and
attitudes about government (Aldrich, 1993; Teixeira, 1992;
Conway, 1991, Abramson and Aldrich, 1982), residential stability
(Estrada-Correa & Johnson, 2011) and group consciousness (Bobo
and Gilliam, 1990; Shingles, 1981) also affect political
participation. Though a significant body of research underpins
the resource model, several expansion opportunities still exist,
a task to which we now turn.
The Retrospective Resource Model
According to traditional resource theory, as an
individual’s resources decline, so too does his/her political
participation. Through the lens of the economic recession, we
expand upon the traditional resource model through considering
resource accumulation changes based on outside forces such as
the Great Recession and argue the changes will modify levels of
political participation. One way of determining economic stress
and resource change is through individual retrospective
5

evaluation of personal economic status—retrospection as the
process of looking backwards to assess resources in a
comparative and cross-sectional manner (e.g. pre-Recession and
post-Recession). Traditional resource theory implies that there
are a plurality of resources that affect participation.
Political participants acknowledge that resources, such as
income, are subject to change, and in turn, act in accordance
with those changes in the political sphere.
During the Great Recession, the nation saw high
foreclosure rates (Estrada-Correa and Johnson, 2012; Ramirez,
2007; Cho and Gimpel, 2009). Moreover, many families moved
locally to find affordable housing. Residential mobility along
with high foreclosure rates is associated with reduced political
participation and consequences for social connectivity
(Fesselmeyer, Le, and Ying, 2013; Stoll, 2013; Allen, 2011;
Highton, 2000 Estrada-Correa and Johnson, 2012; but see Gimpel
2009).

We expect that an individual’s level of participation is

not only determined by current income, but upon how financially
stable the individual feels s/he is, in comparison to the past.
The Retrospective Resource Model and Race/Ethnicity
Against the backdrop of our Retrospective Resource Model,
we consider the effects of the Great Recession on racial and
6

ethnic political participation disparities. Given the fluidity
of resource accumulation following the Great Recession, effect
of resource change on racial and ethnic groups and implications
for political participation is less than clear. The Great
Recession affected communities of color most adversely. For
example, racial and ethnic minorities disproportionately felt
the social disruption from home loss (Fesselmeyer, Le and Ying,
2013; Bocian, Li and Ernst, 2008). Compared to white home loan
borrowers, black and Latino home loan borrowers were 76% and 71%
more likely to experience foreclosure between 2007 and 2009
(Bocian et al., 2012). In studies of residential mobility prior
to the recession, higher residential mobility has been found to
contribute to relatively lower voter turnout rates among Latinos
(Ramirez, 2007).
Prior to the Great Recession, racial and ethnic minority
groups already displayed disproportionate shares of financial
stress as compared to white Americans. In addition, we know that
prior to the Great Recession whites demonstrated higher levels
of political engagement than blacks and Latinos, and Latinos had
the lowest level of political engagement (Ramakrishnan, 2005;
Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; Leighley, 2001; Uhlaner, Cain
and Kiewiet, 1989). When the economic recession hit, many blacks
and Latinos lacked financial safety-nets, and given their
7

already stressed financial situation, they were unable to “hangon” through the storm. Hence this is why we saw that the Great
Recession had a disproportionate impact on minority holdings:
Hispanic median household wealth fell 66% between 2005 and 2009
compared to a 53% fall for black households, compared to only
16% for white households (Cheney-Rice 2014).

Moreover, housing

accounts for 49% of black wealth compared to 28% wealth for the
average white household.

Thus, when we see that people of color

lost their homes at a higher rate than whites during the
recession (Bocian et al., 2012) and that their wealth was linked
to home ownership, then we see why people of color had more
financial stress during the Great Recession. Therefore, the
impact of the Great Recession on resources among racial and
ethnic minority groups will not be of equal magnitude and in
turn its impact on political participation will not be of equal
magnitude either.
However, research has uncovered protective resources among
blacks: group consciousness and linked fate (Dawson, 1994). The
black community has a long history of organizing to overcome
threats against the community as a whole (Shingles, 1981).
Blacks, more so than other groups, tend to have a sense of
belonging with other members of their community and tend to
believe that what happens to others in your group will also
8

affect the individual (Dawson, 1994; Hardy-Fanta, 1993). Given
these protective forces, we expect that in times of hardship
(e.g. financial stress due to the Great Recession) the black
community will be more likely to mobilize rather than disengage,
leading us to our first hypothesis:
H1. Blacks with a stronger linked fate will be mobilized to
engage politically by financial hardship suffered in the
past 12 months.
Conversely, while Latinos' political participation has
increased over time, their rates of participation have been
consistently lower than all other racial and ethnic minority
groups (Uhlaner and Garcia, 1998; Wong, 2000). This is not
surprising given that Latinos tend to have lower socio-economic
status than whites, but also lack the high levels of group
consciousness of the black community (Sanchez and Masuoka,
2010). Given that Latinos were disproportionately affected by
the Great Recession and they lack strong protective resources
such as group consciousness and linked fate, we expect that they
are likely to disengage politically.
H2. Latinos will decrease their political participation if
they experience a bad financial situation in the past 12
months.
In comparison to blacks and Latinos, whites were not as
adversely affected by the Great Recession. Therefore, we argue
9

that whites begin with a diverse set of resources, and as a
result their participation will be less likely to decrease. In
addition to retaining a greater number of resources during the
recession, whites also have political socialization skills and
therefore are likely to continue established habitual
participation patterns. Therefore, we do not expect a
significant effect of the recession on whites’ political
behavior:
H3. Whites will not see any impact of the recession on
their political activity.
Data and Methods
Data and Sample. We make use of the 2,322 respondents who
reported having voted in the 2012 general election from the 2012
Collaborative Multi-Racial Political Study (CMPS)1. The survey
was comprised of people who self-identified as non-Hispanic
black, non-Hispanic white, and Latino. The survey was conducted
between November 16, 2012 and November 26, 2012 in both English
and Spanish by the GfK Group (GfK, formerly Knowledge Networks).
The survey has critical questions gauging the impact of the
Great Recession, thus was well suited for our needs. See the
Technical Appendix for further elaboration on the CMPS data,

Since 92.7% of the sample reported voting in the 2012 general election, we
restrict our sample to voters.
1
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sample, and measures. It can downloaded from
http://hdl.handle.net/1928/24763.
Measures
Dependent Variable. Our dependent variable is a count
variable of the number of political activities reported by the
respondent and asks the respondent to report up to twelve
different political activities and provides a comprehensive
approach to measuring political engagement (please see the
Technical Appendix). Importantly, the questions that make up
this scale are comparable to those used in Brady, Verba and
Schlozman’s (1995) Citizen Participation study in which the
authors used a broad definition of political participation
including electoral and community activities. Our dependent
variable is different from that of Brady et al. (1995) in that
we do not include voting in our dependent variable since voters
make up all respondents in our study.
Key Independent Variables. Our key independent variables
fall into two categories: structural and personal financial
stressor indicators and race/ethnic categories. Structural
Financial Stressors. State financial stressors include the
respondent’s home-state Average Annual Unemployment Rate
specific to race/ethnicity of respondent. We also include
Cushing’s three tiers of state job loss/gains during the
11

recession: states that gained during recession, states that lost
more jobs than expected and states in which job loss was less
than expected (Cushing, 2011).
Personal Financial Stressors. We include a question that
asked respondents to assess their current financial situation
relative to that of 4 years ago (which would have been 2008,
just as the recession began) and is coded as experiencing a
worse financial situation than four years ago or not. Since this
question occurred at the time of the recession, this links
respondents’ personal finance stress to the Great Recession.
Second, we include a question that asked respondents if they
were more or less enthusiastic to participate politically given
their experience with the recession. Finally, we include a
variable citing the number of “bad” financial consequences that
each respondent experienced due to the recession (please see the
Technical Appendix: http://hdl.handle.net/1928/24763).
Race and Ethnic Variables. We utilize three dichotomous
variables for non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, and non-Hispanic
white respondents. In addition to membership in a race/ethnic
group, we also include an indicator of linked fate (please see
the Technical Appendix: http://hdl.handle.net/1928/24763).
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Other Independent Variables. In addition to our key
independent variables, we include several control variables;
please see the Technical Appendix for these variables.
Analytic Plan
After exploring the bivariate relationships between
personal financial indicators and income, we conduct a series of
multivariate analyses. Due to evidence of significant
overdispersion in the sample as a whole (G2=583.89, p<.0001), we
employ negative binomial regression with clustering at the state
level to predict individual-level respondent political
participation in 2012 (Cameron and Trividi, 1998; Long and
Freese, 2006; Tseloni, 1999). We also make use of survey weights
in each of the models, the post-stratification adjustment was
applied based on demographic distributions from the most recent
Current Population Survey. Table A in the Technical Appendix
(http://hdl.handle.net/1928/24763) contains summary descriptive
statistics for all variables.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Results
Table 1 displays the bivariate relationships between the
personal financial stressor variables and family income level.
Here we find generally that respondents with lower family income
report experiencing personal financial stressors at a higher
13

rate, and those with higher family income report experiencing
personal financial stressors at a lower rate. For example, at
34.51%, a significantly greater portion of respondents with
family income between 100-200% of FPL report a worse financial
situation than do the other income categories.

Conversely, a

significantly smaller portion of respondents with the highest
income level, above 400% of FPL, report a worse financial
situation. Thus, this gives support to our Retrospective
Resource Model; people with less financial resources such as
people of color, were more likely to bear the financial stress
of the Great Recession.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Model 1: Political Participation Effects Across Race and Ethnic
Groups
Table 2 - Model 1 is a negative binomial regression model
that employs our full sample of respondents. We find that
Hispanic respondents have the lowest level of political
participation (p<0.01).

By contrast, black respondents do not

differ statistically in their level of participation from white
respondents. Respondents who report holding a Bachelor’s degree
or higher are more likely to engage in political activities than
those who have not completed high school (p<0.05). Finally,
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across all race/ethnic groups, reporting a negative financial
situation is associated with a higher number of political acts.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Model 2: Political Participation Effects for Black Respondents
Table 3 provides the negative binomial regression results
for the independent effects of economic threats for each race
and ethnic group: black, Latino and white. Model 2 reports the
results for black respondents and all statistically significant
variables in this model have a positive, or mobilizing, impact
on the political participation rates of black respondents. With
particular regard to our indicators of Great Recession economic
threat, black respondents experience surges in rates of
participation when they experience increased financial stress
through (1) high state black unemployment rates (p<.05), (2)
negative financial situations (p<.001), and (3) personal
enthusiasm for political participation given financial stress
(p<0.05). The other independent variables that positively
influence black political participation are having a level of
group consciousness, a high school diploma or more and reporting
a high level of political interest in the 2012 Presidential
Election.
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Model 3: Political Participation Effects for Hispanic
Respondents
Continued on Table 3 - Model 3, the Great Recession
economic indicators are statistically significant for Hispanic
respondent’s participation rates. First, Hispanic respondents
who report a worse financial situation from four years ago,
experience an increase of political participation compared with
those who do not report a worse financial situation. However,
Hispanics who report negative financial situations such as
foreclosure or bankruptcy experience a decrease in political
participation and become demobilized from the political process.
Finally, Hispanic respondents who report a high level of
political interest in the 2012 Presidential Election report
engaging in more political activities.
Model 4: Political Participation Effects for White Respondents
In terms of our key independent variables, white
respondents are unaffected by four of the six economic indicator
variables on Table 3 - Model 4. Only the economic indicator of
state job loss less than expected is statistically significant
at the less than .05 level of confidence with the variable
having a positive effect on political participation. In sum,
white respondents’ political participation appears to be largely
16

unaffected by Great Recession economic threats. Similar to the
other race and ethnic groups, whites who report a high level of
political interest in the 2012 Presidential Election report more
political activities.
Conclusion
Since June 2009, 39% of individual Americans rate their
self-assessed financial situation as “only fair” (DeSilver,
2014). We propose understanding the role of economic stress on
political participation through examining a retrospective (preand post-Recession) evaluation of individual economic status.
The 2012 Collaborative Multi-Racial Political Study provided the
opportunity for us to extend the traditional resource model and
test whether retrospective evaluation of resources provides
insight into changes in political participation. Our findings
suggest that individuals who perceive a change in economic
status do respond differently in their political participation.
One cannot assume that a decrease in resources will result in a
decrease in political participation.
As expected, we find that financial stress mobilizes black
political participation and a high level of linked fate seems to
have a protective role. We should note that black political
engagement remains high even after controlling for Great
17

Recession indicators, socioeconomic status, and political
enthusiasm; this suggests that even during tough times blacks
remain politically active.
Also as expected, we see that Latinos participate less than
other groups and that personal economic stress or bad
consequences of the Great Recession decreases political
participation. This is an important finding especially since
Hispanics already participate in lower levels compared to whites
and blacks. Even less political participation among Hispanics
may lead to harmful democratic affects such as, political
parties devoting even fewer resources to mobilizing Hispanics,
and a possible decrease in descriptive representation.

Finally,

we find support that whites are largely politically unaffected
by Recession-related economic stress and that political interest
plays a major component in predicting white political behavior.
Overall, we find that these different communities responded
differently politically to financial stress.

Using an extended

resource models allows us to examine not only one’s material and
psychological resources but also how their retrospective
feelings about financial stressors affects their political
participation.

While Latinos and blacks were hardest hit by the

recession, blacks had the protective resource of linked fate
which cushioned the financial stress and helped them maintain
18

participation in the political sphere.

Since Latinos lack the

resource of linked fate (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010), coupled with
their preceding low levels of political participation and high
levels of financial stress, it is not surprising that we find
they had low levels of political participation.

Finally, since

whites have pre-existing high levels of political socialization
and participation, combined with the fact that they were not
hard hit by the Great Recession, this led to their political
participation being relatively unaffected.

This study shows

that we are not a monolithic nation and we cannot expect
communities to react to financial stressors in the same manner.
As economic inequity increases in the U.S. it is even more
critical to continue to examine financial stress and how it
affects communities differently.

We find for Latinos, it can be

dangerous, as financial stress is leading to low levels of
political participation.

In a democratic society we all want to

strive for equality in participation.

Here we are seeing that

financial stress can lead to increased inequity in political
participation, and if this inequity persists it may further
threaten our ideal of an egalitarian democracy.
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TABLE 1.
Relationship between Personal Financial Stressors and Household Income
% Reporting
Mean negative
% More
worse
financial
enthusiastic
financial
situations
given financial
situation than
situation
4 years ago
Income <100% FPL
32.13
2.022***
37.38
Income 100-200% FPL

34.51*

2.056***

35.10

Income 200%-300% FPL

31.22

1.834**

35.36

Income 300%-400% FPL

33.55

1.613

42.90**

24.95*

1.387***

34.10

29.41

1.668

36.05

Income >400% FPL
All

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Respondents in each income category tested against all other respondents as a single group.
Chi2 test used for first and third columns, ttest used for middle column.
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TABLE 2.
Model 1: Political Participation
Negative Binomial Regression
Coefficient
State Unemployment Rate 2011 (all)
State’s Job Loss Less than Expected
State’s Job Loss More than Expected
Residential Stability-Time at Current Address
Worse Financial Situation than 4 yrs. Ago
Negative Financial Situations
Enthusiasm Political Engagement Given Financial Situation

Black
Hispanic
High Group Consciousness
Age
High School Diploma
Some College
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher
Household Income 100%-199% FPL
Household Income 200%-299% FPL
Household Income 300%-399% FPL
Household Income >=400% FPL
High Trust in Government
Political Interest in 2012 Presidential Election
Constant
Number of Observations
Log Pseudolikelihood
Prob > chi2

-0.011
0.188
-0.041
-0.004
-0.139
0.088**
0.361**
-0.143
-0.279**
0.045
0.018***
0.111
0.509
0.763*
-0.651**
-0.228
-0.163
0.007
0.031
1.150***
-2.202***
2322
-2680.74
0.000***

Robust
Standard
Error
0.032
0.152
0.108
0.006
0.154
0.041
0.152
0.148
0.098
0.091
0.004
0.334
0.348
0.381
0.269
0.290
0.305
0.257
0.119
0.107
0.503

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
The dependent variable is the number of political activities that each respondent engaged in.
Clustered by state, with robust standard errors.
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TABLE 3.
Political Participation by Race/Ethnicity
Negative Binomial Regression
Model 2: Model 3:
Black
Hispanic
State Unemployment Rate 2011 (by race/ethnicity)
0.059*
0.015

Model 4:
White
-0.063

(0.027)

(0.045)

(0.036)

State’s Job Loss Less than Expected

-0.280

0.180

0.367*

(0.209)

(0.198)

(0.164)

State’s Job Loss More than Expected

-0.257

0.031

0.080

(0.169)

(0.171)

(0.115)

-0.007

Residential Stability-Time at Current Address
Worse Financial Situation than 4 yrs. Ago
Negative Financial Situations
Enthusiasm Political Engagement Given Financial Situation

High Group Consciousness
Age

0.016

0.004

(0.009)

(0.006)

(0.005)

0.254

0.525***

-0.255
(0.213)

(0.235)

(0.129)

0.321***

-0.076*

0.034

(0.062)

(0.035)

(0.056)

0.388*

0.806***

0.345

(0.180)

(0.128)

(0.180)

0.427*

0.002

-0.084

(0.176)

(0.198)

(0.116)

0.015

0.019**

0.020***

(0.008)

(0.006)

(0.005)

High School Diploma

0.849*

0.719

-0.337

(0.400)

(0.394)

(0.404)

Some College

1.024*

0.781*

0.170

(0.424)

(0.367)

(0.467)

1.251**

1.216**

0.379

(0.421)

(0.413)

(0.523)

-0.204

0.246

-1.012*

(0.540)

(0.331)

(0.416)

Household Income 200%-299% FPL

0.122

-0.360

-0.337

(0.541)

(0.295)

(0.373)

Household Income 300%-399% FPL

-0.120

0.002

-0.246

Bachelor’s Degree or Higher
Household Income 100%-199% FPL

Household Income >=400% FPL
High Trust in Government
Political Interest in 2012 Presidential Election

Constant
Number of Observations
Log Pseudolikelihood
Prob > chi2

(0.520)

(0.277)

(0.414)

0.195

-0.127

-0.060

(0.429)

(0.330)

0.204

-0.130

(0.198)

(0.166)

(0.352)
-0.022
(0.155)

0.951***

1.092***

1.177***

(0.196)

(0.172)

(0.119)

-4.78***

-3.41***

-1.37*

(0.906)

(0.796)

(0.615)

717

815

788

-716.66

-708.38

-929.73

0.000***

0.000***

0.000***

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
The dependent variable is the number of political activities that each respondent engaged in.
Clustered by state, with robust standard errors.
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